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Abstract. We propose a new and straightforward functional encryption
scheme for the bounded-norm inner-product functionality (IPFE) in the
public-key settings. We prove the security of the proposed scheme with
respect to standard assumptions. Specifically, our construction is secure
under the Inverse Decisional Diffie-Hellman computational hardness as-
sumption (DDHI), which is not known to imply or be implied by DDH.
The proof technique chiefly exploits the algebraic properties of matrices,
viewed as linear maps between vector spaces.
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1 Introduction
Functional encryption (FE), formalized through the works of O’Neill[O’N10]
and Boneh, Sahai and Waters [BSW11], came up as an ambitious cryptographic
paradigm allowing for surgical access over encrypted data: given a ciphertext
CT encrypting some input message (i.e. plaintext) m, the holder of a token (or
functional key) skf can determine the value of the function f evaluated on the
plaintext m, and nothing else about m (except for the maybe its size). Due to the
wide range of potential applications, functional encryption has been regarded as
a powerful tool when compared to the existing, classical, well-established crypto-
graphic primitives, such as public-key encryption or identity-based encryption.
Goldwasser et al. [GKP+13] mention data-mining techniques such as search-
ing for keywords over encrypted data as a potential utilization of FE in practice.
Another major workstream study the relationship between functional encryption
and indistinguishability obfuscation [GGH+13,AJ15,BV15,AFH+16,LPST16,JLS20].
With respect to its derivatives, the original definitional landscape for FE
has been extended to functional signatures (FS) and functional pseudorandom
functions, which were introduced with the work of Boyle, Goldwasser and Ivan
[BGI14]. The aim of their work is to capture the counterpart of functional en-
cryption with reference to signing capabilities (one signs the value of a function
f applied on a message m, the resulting signature being verifiable under the
master public-key).
With respect to the prior and actual research status on functional encryption,
we identify two major spheres: (1) a more general setting trying to achieve FE
schemes that support an unbounded number of functional keys; such works in-
vestigate generic theoretical implications/separations between different kinds of
primitives — such as fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE), attribute-based en-
cryption (ABE) [BGG+14] and FE [GKP+13] — or between different “flavours”
of functional encryption: [LPST16,KS17,JLS20] study the relation between private-
key and public-key functional encryption, or between single-input and multi-
input schemes [BKS16]; (2) a second group of works concentrates on construc-
tions targeting simple functionalities (i.e. inner-product or quadratic FE), such
as the ones presented in [ABDP15,BBL17,BJK15,DDM16,Lin16,BCFG17,Tom],
with their security relying on well-established assumption.
Inner-Product Functional Encryption. In terms of its semantics, an FE
scheme for the simple inner-product functionality (IPFE) with a bounded norm
can be informally described as follows: a plaintext is represented through a vec-
tor x and its corresponding ciphertext is CTx. A functional key sky is issued
for each corresponding vector y. Decryption takes as input the pair (CTx, sky),
the output being x> · y. Despite its simplicity, an inner product functionality
may found attractive applications: as a motivational example, assume a na-
tional fiscal agency stores the monthly incomes of the citizens of a country in an
encrypted format (in order to prevent potential leaks from the highly sensitive
data). Suppose that at some point, the government would like to introduce a
differential tax scale taking into consideration the cumulative income (e.g 1%
for January, 2% for February, . . ., 30% for December)1. In order to simulate
the impact of these measures to the population and to the budget execution for
a year, an audit company would like to query the database without knowing
the actual financial assets of citizens. Turning the layman description into one
closer to a program specification, we would represent the encrypted incomes as
a 12-dimensional vector x, and the tax percents as a vector y ← (1, 2, . . . , 30).
Assuming that no annual global income is greater than B, one can compute the
required queries through the means of an inner-product functional encryption
scheme. Thus, the actual data in the newly planned-taxes may be revealed or
not to an audit company. If there is no concern in revealing such data, an IPFE
scheme would suffice. However, if y needs to be protected, a function-hiding
search (one that hides y) must be performed.
Depending on the application, one may also demand that an FE scheme
satisfies function privacy : a guarantee that the functional key skf does not reveal
the function f that is considered, in addition to the original s-IND-FE-CPA
security notion [DDM16]. For the case of IPFE, this translates into preventing an
adversary from distinguishing between the values of y into sky as well as the value
of the plaintext. As stated in [BJK15], function-hiding FE cannot be achieved
in the public-key setting: an adversary can obtain the keys for two different
functions f1 and f2, then using the public mpk it can obtain a distinguishing
CTm such that f1(m) 6= f2(m).
1 For instance, such a government would like to gain more from the interests obtained
through bank deposits, which accumulates over the year.
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1.1 Our contributions
Despite the simplicity of the construction we propose, we believe the main con-
tribution of this work relies on the proof techniques. We reuse an agile algebraic
technicality showed by Hofheinz and Jager in [HJ16], and we give a brief overview
in what follows. Assume a vector u lies in a subspace U . One can implement a
linear map M : U → S, as follows: (1) build C, a matrix mapping W → U ,
where W is the subspace spanned by the first n − 1 canonical vectors (having
the element in position n set to 0); (2) build C′ as a matrix that maps W → S.




−−→ S, as depicted in
Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Assuming a vector space of dimension 3 over Zp, the matrix C′ will map entries
in W (having z = 0) to the vector space defined by the first 2 rows in C′. Similarly
one can imagine C :W → U (thus C−1 : U → W) and compute its inverse, in order to
set M← C−1 ·C′.
Our contribution (Section 3) is a (plain) selectively-secure IPFE scheme. We
use the notations introduced in [EHK+13], and define [a] := ga, where g is a
cyclic group generator and a is an element over Zp. The bulk of the construction
can be characterized as follows: (1) the msk is set to a uniformly sampled matrix





(2) encryption is done by sampling a random vector t over Znp , “masking” x
as x + t and encoding in the group as: [x + t]. Additionally, the encoding of
t> ·T−1 is released; (3) to decrypt, one needs to know y, together with y> ·T.
Then the decryption computes
[
y> · (t + x)− y> · t
]





)2. The very interesting bit comes with the s-IND-FE-CPA proof:
we instantiate an auxiliary matrix T′ via the DDHI assumption (Definition 5)
by implicitly setting the last row in T′ to be of the form: (0, . . . , 0, a), where [a] is
taken from the DDHI-tuple. Essentially, this prevents an adversary deriving sky
where y⊥(xL−xR) — we achieve this by left-multiplying T′ with a linear map L :
(xL−xR)→W using a technique developed in [HJ16]. Most importantly, given
2 Solving DLOG to recover inner-products, while assuming they have bounded norm
is a technique used in the existing works on IPFE.
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the form of T′, we can always set its inverse (which will contain the challenge[
a−1 or $
]
) only in its last column.
2 Definitions
Conventions. We denote by s←$ S the fact that s is picked uniformly at ran-
dom from a finite set S. Variables in bold capital letters stand for matrices (e.g.
M) while bold lowercase letters represent vectors (e.g. u). A subscript i on a
vector u (e.g. ui) stands for the i-th component of the vector. An analogue con-
vention is used for matrices. By [a] := ga we denote the “encoding of an element”
w.r.t. a group generator g ∈ G, while through [M] and [u], we denote the encod-
ings of a matrix, respectively vector. W denotes the matrix formed by the top
n−1 rows of a matrix W of size n×n. When working with a family of vectors v,
we use the upper script to distinguish between them: v(0),v(1), . . .. We abuse no-
tation and extend it to bilinear maps by writing e([A], [B]) = e(g, g)A·B = [A·B]
to denote the matrix obtained after multiplying the exponents and getting as a
result the pairing of entries. By C(A), we denote the columnspace of a matrix
A, and by C(A>), we denote its rowspace. We denote the security parameter by
λ ∈ N and we assume it is given to all algorithms in the unary representation 1λ.
We regard an algorithm as being randomized (unless stated) and being modeled
by a Turing machine. PPT as usual stands for “probabilistic polynomial-time.”
Given a randomized algorithm A we denote the action of running A on input(s)
(1λ, x1, . . .) with uniform random coins r and assigning the output(s) to (y1, . . .)
by (y1, . . .)←$ A(1λ, x1, . . . ; r). We denote the set of all negligible functions by
Negl. With x̄ ≺ x, we denote a bitstring prefix.
2.1 Functional Encryption - Definitions
When considering the encryption setting, one should distinguish between two
kinds of functional encryption schemes: (1) on the one hand, in public-key FE
schemes, encryption happens through the means of a master public-key, while
in (2) the private-key paradigm, access to a master private-key must be offered
in order to compute a ciphertext. Such a difference is significant from multi-
ple points of view: efficiency, malleability, use cases etc., but in our work, we
focus exclusively on certain security notions (i.e. on indistinguishability). Since
FE is a central notion of this work, we define here the two concepts. In terms
of the security experiments, we provide the games for selective and adaptive
functional versions of “chosen-plaintext attack” security. We also extend and
cover function-hiding, with the remarkable implication that a function-hiding
FE scheme achieves s-IND-FE-CPA-security [DDM16].
Definition 1 (Functional Encryption Scheme - Public-Key Setting).
A functional encryption scheme FE in the public-key setting consists of a
tuple of algorithms (Gen, KDer, Enc, Dec) such that:
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1. (msk,mpk)←$ FE.Gen(1λ) : guven the unary representation of the security
parameters λ, it outputs a pair of master secret/public keys.
2. CT←$ FE.Enc(mpk,m): the randomized encryption procedure encrypts the
plaintext m with respect to the master key mpk.
3. skf←$ FE.KDer(msk, f): using the master secret key and the given func-
tionality f , the (possibly randomized) key-derivation procedure outputs a
functioal key skf .
4. FE.Dec(skf ,CT) decrypts the ciphertext CT using the functional key skf
in order to learn a valid message f(m) or a special symbol ⊥, in case the
decryption procedure fails.
– We say that a public-key FE scheme is correct if the following holds:
Pr





 ∈ 1−Negl(λ) .
– We say that a public-key FE scheme is (selective) s-IND-FE-CPA-secure if
the advantage of any PPT adversary A against the s-IND-FE-CPA-game
defined in Figure 2 is negligible:
Advs-IND-FE-CPAA,FE (λ) :=
∣∣Pr [s-IND-FE-CPAAFE(λ) = 1]− 12 ∣∣ ∈ Negl(λ) .
Similarly, we say that it is (adaptive) IND-FE-CPA-secure if:
AdvIND-FE-CPAA,FE (λ) :=
∣∣Pr [IND-FE-CPAAFE(λ) = 1]− 12 ∣∣ ∈ Negl(λ) .
Private-Key Setting. Originally, FE has been introduced in the public-key
setting, and was regarded as the most general extension of the PKE paradigm.
However, the private-key counterpart was recently related to the public-key
framework via a series of results [BKS16,KS17], which increases the interest in
the primitive3. For completeness, we provide the definition of the scheme below:
Definition 2 (Functional Encryption Scheme - Private-Key Setting).
A functional encryption scheme FE in the private-key setting consists of a tuple
of PPT algorithms (Gen, KDer, Enc, Dec) such that:
1. msk←$ FE.Gen(1λ) : takes as input the unary representation of the security
parameters and outputs msk.
2. skf←$ FE.KDer(msk, f): given the master secret key and a function f , the
(randomized) key-derivation procedure outputs a corresponding skf .
3. CT←$ FE.Enc(msk,m): the randomized encryption procedure encrypts the
plaintext m with respect to msk.










b′←$ A KDermsk(·),Encmsk(·)(1λ,CT∗; state)
b′←$ AKDermsk(·)(1λ,CT∗,mpk; state)
if ∃f ∈ L s.t. f(m0) 6= f(m1)
return 0
return b = b′
Proc. KDermsk(f):










if ∃f ∈ L s.t. f(m0) 6= f(m1) :
return 0
return b = b′
Proc. KDermsk(f):
L← L ∪ {f}
skf←$ FE.KDer(msk, f)
return skf
Fig. 2. The selective and adaptive indistinguishability experiment defined for a func-
tional encryption scheme. The difference between the private-key and the public-key
settings are marked in boxed lines of codes, corresponding to the latter notion.
4. FE.Dec(skf ,CT) decrypts the CT using the functional key skf in order to
learn a valid message f(m) or a special symbol ⊥, in case the decryption
procedure fails.
– We say that a private-key FE scheme is correct if:
Pr





 = 1−Negl(λ) .
– A private-key FE scheme is (selective) s-IND-FE-CPA-secure if the ad-
vantage of any PPT adversary A against the s-IND-FE-CPA-game defined
in Figure 2 is negligible:
AdvIND-FE-CPAA,FE (λ) :=
∣∣Pr [IND-FE-CPAAFE(λ) = 1]− 12 ∣∣ ∈ Negl(λ) .
Similarly, we say that it is (adaptive) IND-FE-CPA-secure if:
AdvIND-FE-CPAA,FE (λ) :=
∣∣Pr [IND-FE-CPAAFE(λ) = 1]− 12 ∣∣ ∈ Negl(λ) .
Inner-Product Functional Encryption. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, constructing functional encryption for general-purpose circuits is an open
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problem. We formally define the bounded-norm inner-product functionality in
what follows:
Definition 3 (Bounded-Norm Inner-Product Functionality). Let (x,y) ∈
Z2np and B < p. We define IPB(x,y) = x> ·y, when x> ·y ≤ B and IPB(x,y) =
⊥ otherwise.
Function-Hiding IPFE Schemes The function hiding property for IPFE has
been considered in the work of [BJK15]. The goal is to hide the function that
is being computed from the view of a computationally bounded adversary. The
security games are defined in Figure 3.
Definition 4 (Function Hiding - Private-Key Setting). A private-key FE
scheme is FHIDE-secure if the advantage of any PPT adversary A against the
FHIDE-game defined in Figure 3 is negligible:
AdvFHIDEA,FE (λ) :=







return b = b′ ∧Valid(LEnc,LKDer)
Encmsk(m
L,mR):











∀(mLi ,mRi )× (skfLj , skf
R
j ) ∈ LEnc × LKDer:
if fLj (m
L















Fig. 3. Function hiding in the private key setting.
Note that the function-hiding property implies indistinguishability (s-IND-FE-CPA)
for free [DDM16].
2.2 Computational Hardness Assumptions
We define the computational hypothesis to be used throughout the next sections.
The Inverse-DDH asks an adversary to distinguish between the inverse of an
element and a randomly sampled one, in the presence of a computationally
bounded adversary. This assumption is a restriction of the `-DDHI assumption,
introduced in [BDZ03].
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Definition 5 (Decisional-Diffie Hellman Inversion Assumption). Let G
be a group of prime order p, [1] a generator and r←$ Zp. The following advantage
of any PPT adversary A is negligible:
AdvDDHIA (λ) := Pr [A([1], [a], [r]) = 1]− Pr
[




More recently, a framework of assumptions [EHK+13] were derived from the
matrix-form of the DDH assumption. We define two of them.
Definition 6 (Uk −MDDH [EHK+13]). Let Uk stand for the uniform dis-
tribution defined over the sets of matrices of size (k+ 1)× k with elements over
a cyclic group G of prime order p. Let A be a matrix sampled according to dis-
tribution Uk and z←$ Zkp and r←$ Zk+1p . The following advantage of any PPT
adversary A is negligible:
AdvUk−MDDHA (λ) := Pr [A([z], [A], [A · z]) = 1]−
Pr [A([z], [A], [r]) = 1] ∈ Negl(λ) .
(2)
Definition 7 (n −Rankn, [HJ16]). Let Mi denote a matrix of rank i. Let
Mn←$ Zn×np and Mn−1←$
{
M ∈ Zn×np | rank(M) = n− 1
}
. Then, for any PPT
adversary A the following holds:
AdvAn−Rank(λ) := Pr [1←$ A([Mn])]− Pr [1←$ A([Mn−1])] ∈ Negl(λ)
3 A Simple IPFE Scheme From DDH-Inversion Problem
In this section we introduce a simple inner-product functional encryption scheme
in the public-key setting. We recall the ElGamal instantiation of the first inner-
product FE scheme proposed in the literature [ABDP15], since its simplicity
provides an illuminating example:
1. The master secret key consists of an n-dimensional vector s taken over Zp,
while the master public-key is set to be the encoding of s.
2. Encrypting the vector x is done by sampling a uniform r over Zp and setting
CT← ([r] , [rs + x]).
3. The functional key sky corresponding to y is deterministically generated and
obtained as s> · y;
4. The decryption steps through (a) getting [rs> ·y+x> ·y], (b) getting [rs> ·y],
(c) subtracting the exponents in (b) from the ones in (a) and computing the





As regards storage efficiency, the size of the mpk consists in n elements, while
the sizes of CTx and skf are n + 1 group elements, respectively 1 element. As
can be observed in Section 3.1, the original proposal outperforms our candidate
construction in both memory and time efficiency. Remarkably, the framework
developed in [ABDP15] depends generically on the IND-CPA of the underly-
ing public-key encryption scheme (if the scheme posses certain structural and
homomorphic properties). Thus, for the case of ElGamal, the s-IND-FE-CPA
follows from DDH. We emphasize that the proof we give is based on a different,
unrelated assumption: DDHI, which neither implies or is implied by DDH.
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3.1 Construction
This section introduces a simple IPFE scheme. Concretely, the master secret-
key consists of a square matrix T sampled uniformly at random from Zn×np . The
key-derivation procedure corresponding to vector y makes use of T, in order to
derive y> ·T. Encrypting x makes use of the encoded inverse of T as mpk and




, as this operation gives rise to a trivially
deterministic scheme. We face this issue by introducing additional randomness









and then “subtracting” this quantity from
[∑k
i (xi + ti) · yi
]
.
Finally, the inner-product of x> · y is encapsulated in the exponent. To recover
it, we make use of the assumed bounded-norm property of our scheme, extracting


















for i← 1, n do:
[CTi]← [xi + ti]
[CTx]←
(
[CT1] , . . . , [CTn] , [tt]
)
return CTx
KDer(msk,y← (y1, . . . ,yn)):
T← msk














Fig. 4. A simple, bounded-norm inner-product functional encryption scheme, with the
security proof relying on DDHI assumption.
Lemma 1 (Correctness). The IPFE construction in Figure 4 enjoys cor-



































Given that the ‖x>·y‖ is bounded byB, one can store in a table the encodings
of the values 1 → B. This allows to query the DLOG through lookups in the
table during the decryption procedure.
3.2 Security
Theorem 1. The bounded-norm IPFE construction introduced in Figure 4 en-
joys s-IND-FE-CPA-security (Definition 1) under the DDHI (Definition 5).
The advantage of any PPT adversary A against the s-IND-FE-CPA security
experiment is bounded as follows:
Advs-IND-FE-CPAA′,FE (λ) ≤ Adv
DDHI
A (λ) .
Proof. We show via a proof by contradiction that DDHI-hard implies the
scheme in Figure 4 is s-IND-FE-CPA-secure. Let A be an adversary against
the s-IND-FE-CPA-security of our construction. We construct a PPT algorithm
A′ that makes use of A as an oracle in order to break the DDHI assumption.
The DDHI game with respect to a group G of prime order p commences by sam-
pling uniformly at random a←$ Zp and providing to A′ the tuple ([1] , [a] , [z]),
where z is either sampled uniformly at random over G or z ← a−1. In the
DDHI-security experiment, A′ will simulate the view of an adversary, while in
the view of A, A′ will “implement” the s-IND-FE-CPA security experiment.
Key-Derivation Queries. The first observation one can make comes by re-
stricting the s-IND-FE-CPA experiment to inner-product functionalities. Specif-
ically, the IPFE instantiation of the s-IND-FE-CPA experiment enables key-
queries corresponding to vectors y such that:
∀y ∈ Znp : y> · xL = y> · xR (4)




. This suggest that the
challenge tuple (xL,xR) implicitly defines an (n− 1)-dimensional subspace:
S :=
{




Prohibiting key-derivations for vectors outside S is one of the milestones in
our security proof. The core idea is to implement a linear map L, using an astute
algebraic trick presented in [HJ16], and “embed” this linear map in the matrix
T. Concretely, given y ∈ S, we can define a matrix L−1 that will map vectors
from S to W, where W stands for the (n− 1)-dimensional vector space spanned
by the first n − 1 vectors in the canonical basis over Zp (or equivalently, the
subspace containing all vectors over Znp with the last component set to 0):
W :=
{
v ∈ Znp : vn = 0
}
(6)
Obtaining L−1 is done by getting the inverse of L, where L :W → S. The way
to implement the matrix L is as follows: (1) sample uniformly at random a basis






Finally, the matrix T can be determined by sampling uniformly at random




















0 . . . 0 a
 (7)
Note that the construction of T′ implicitly sets to a the value in position (n, n).
Remark. If y ∈ S, then the KDer procedure introduced in Figure 4 halts (i.e.
A′ can simulate KDer).








· T′. From y ∈ S and L−1 : S → W, it results that y · L−1 ∈ W
(thus it has the last component 0). When performing the multiplication with
T′, the last row in T′ is ignored due to the 0 component occurring in y · L−1,
and thus A′ is agnostic of the value of a. On the other hand, if y 6∈ S, then
y ·L−1 6∈ W, meaning that the last row in T is used, (impossibility of simulation
without knowledge of a).




















































L :W → S .
Note the special form of T′(−1). The vectors s(1), . . . , s(n−1) are obtained from
the inverse of T′ and depend on r(1), . . . , r(n−1). As a general remark, note that[
T−1 · L
]
can be computed, since L is known “in plain”.
The Challenge Ciphertext. A′ embeds the challenge value, namely [z] ←[
a−1
]
or [z] ← [r] in the challenge ciphertext. A′ samples uniformly at random
b ∈ {L,R} and A′ encrypts x(b) with respect to the mpk. Then, A′ samples t
from Znp such that t> ·u = 0. Then, [tt]← [T · t] is also given to the adversary.
Below, we show that in both cases, the adversary is able decrypt with re-
spect to a key sky, independently of the challenge value [z], the ciphertext being
information theoretically hidden.








is information-theoretically hidden from the view of the adversaryA. For this








since yy ← y>L−1 · T′ and [tt] ←
[
T′−1 · L · t
]
, since for this case L−1 ·
T′ · T′−1 · L is symbolically equivalent to the identity matrix. Since t is a














– Case 2: when [z] ← [r], the argument becomes more convoluted, and we

























0 . . . 0 a−1
+





0 . . . 0 (r − a−1) · s(n−1)n
0 . . . 0 (r − a−1)
 .
(11)
Encrypting xb for this case is done as well by sampling a t such that t> ·u =




as part of the challenge ciphertext. The only





, which can be written as:[




T′−1a−1 · L · t + T
′−1














y> · t + y> · L−1 ·T′a ·T′−1r · L · t
]
(13)
We develop on the second term of the sum, showing it is actually 0.
y> · L−1 ·T′a ·T′−1r · L · t = y> · L−1 ·





0 . . . 0 f
0 . . . 0 g
 · L · t
= (y1 . . . yn−1 0) ·





0 . . . 0 f
0 . . . 0 g
 · L · t
= (0 . . . 0 α) · L · t
= α · u> · t
(14)
Since t>·u = 0, then the last part of the sum is 0. This proves that decryption
works, and xb is information theoretically hidden.
4 A Word on Our Assumption
The relations between decisional Diffie Hellman, the Square DDH and the Inverse
DDH, have been studied in the work of [BDZ03]. Their work, does not show that
DDH is equivalent to DDHI.
However, the paper shows a) DDHI ⇐⇒ SquareDDH, and b) SquareDDH
=⇒ DDH. By transitivity, it follows that DDHI is a stronger assumption than
DDH.
We provide a second look over the first result that is described in Section 3.2
of [BDZ03], namely DDHI =⇒ SquareDDH. In their reduction “DDHI =⇒
SquareDDH”, the authors assume a SquareDDH adversary. The reduction receives
as input
(g, gx, gr) ,
where r is either random or 1/x.
Then, in order to simulate a SquareDDH tuple, one should set it as (gr∗s, gs, gx∗s
2
).









Thus, the claim that DDHI =⇒ DDH may not be true over the algebraic
structure we consider herein.
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